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Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/ Western Tanzanian Regional Strategy

The situation in the sub-region requires a united long-term strategy to deal with the complex, multifaceted issues. Demographics, ethnicity and poverty are the underlying causes of the problems we now face. These problems are exacerbated by lack of sufficient land within the two countries of Burundi and Rwanda and poverty. A short-term solution may be the separation of the two groups but it is not likely to succeed given their strong ties to their respective countries. We must continue to work for reconciliation underscoring clearly that we support majority rule but with protection of minority rights, the cornerstones of democracy. We should continue to take advantage of opportunities to explain our policy with a view to continue building a broad consensus for it in Washington and abroad.

## Principles Governing Our Policy

- We support a democratic process in both Rwanda and Burundi. This means governments that practice genuine powersharing and protection of minority rights.
- We will continue to highlight human rights abuses within both countries and push for punishment for abusers.
- o Above all, do no harm.
- U. S. Interests

#### Rwanda/Burundi

- a. Regional Stability. Promotion of strong internal institutions, particularly through effective judicial administration and a multi-ethnic military.
- **b.** Establishment of a climate conducive to trading opportunities and the establishment of businesses.
- c. Avoiding future large-scale humanitarian crisis.
- d. Stopping the cycles of impunity in Africa and of genocide.

Regional Stability

Assumptions:

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- o Tutsi hegemony is growing in the sub-region. Cooperation between the militaries of Rwanda and Burundi exists and will grown as Hutus rearm themselves and cross border violence increases. Given Tutsi minority status, this is an inherently unstable development and conducive to state disintegration/failure.
- o The militaries in both countries do not necessarily share our sub-regional vision of powersharing in the two countries.
- o The majority of Hutu refugees will not return to Rwanda for many years. Therefore, we must relocate refugees to minimize economic costs to the international community.
- O Continued presence of refugees in eastern Zaire and western Tanzania will continue to have a destabilizing effect not only on the two countries but the region.
- o Zaire and Tanzania will tire of refugees on their soil and perhaps resort to closing borders, aiding Hutus against GOR, invading Rwanda, Burundi or both, etc. (Tanzania has already closed its borders to refugees.)
- o The RPA may stage preemptive strikes into Zaire to get at the EX-FAR. Rwanda Hutns will use an insurgency to force political settlement with the RPA.

#### Goals and Objectives.

1. Push for genuine powersharing in Rwanda. Our actions must strengthen the civilian government.

#### Internal Rwanda Elements:

- -- Provide IMET.
- -- Push donors on contributing to re-establishment of a judicial system. Begin at provincial level.
- -- Push International Tribunal to begin indictments and prosecution of genocide cases before end of the year.
- -- Push GOR to begin trials of military accused of human rights abuses.
- -- Push GOR to announce its list of war criminals. This will have a positive effect on Hutus living in refugee camps.
- Push GOR to relieve prison conditions by releasing .

  detainees and issuing warinings to population not to engage in individual retribution.

- -- Human Rights Training for all groups across the political spectrum. Get Gov't to make it a required course for all government employees including military personnel.
- -- Push GOR to establish benchmarks for broadening political base.
- -- Demobilize children in RPA.
- -- Broaden base of military.
- -- Encourage aid programs in areas of education and development ( for demobilize youth) of job training skills in areas which will encourage outside investments.
- -- IMET to Rwanda. Stress role of a military in a civilian government as well as provide other courses.
- o Internal Burundi Elements:
- -- In Burundi, support peace and reconciliation programs underway with appropriate human rights safeguards and plans for a national debate.
- IMET program should stress role of a military in a civilian government and provide courses.
- -- Work with political parties to combat ethnic hatred; provide IV grants to study party process in the U.S.
- -- Encourage aid programs in areas of education and development of job training skills in areas which will encourage outside investments.
- -- Create work programs for youth, thus marginalizing Bagaza's/Nyangoma's influence on them.
- -- Get churches more active in reconciliation efforts/ Work with Catholic Dioceses and others to take lead;
- -- Create a multi-ethnic police force.
- Increase OAU/Human Rights monitors.
- -- Create a non-government peace radio.
- 2. Support an international political conference of countries in the Great Lakes region with five perm reps of UNSC as observers. Conference and follow-up sessions should be organized along Middle East talks format.

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- o Refugees
- -- Resettle refugees away from borders and provide them with tools/ etc. to begin new lives.
- -- Explore with Tanzania/Zaire possibilities for relocating those refugees on its soil in Tanzania/Zaire for the medium-term.
- -- Explore possibility with Tribunal officials of setting up shop on edge of camps to inform inhabitants whether or not they can expect to face prosecution upon return to Rwanda. This may speed up voluntary repatriation of those who are skeptical about their future.
- -- Decrease rations to refugees. This will decrease funds available to refugees to buy weapons, etc.
- -- Explore possibility of further separating military from civilians in camps.
- -- Explore placing Zairian/Tanzanian monitors in non-UNHCR camps to monitor activities of ex-Far.

#### Track II Diplomacy:

Working with NGOs interested in Burundi. A number of U.S. and international NGOs are active in Burundi. We should continue to work with them and pursue the follwing:

-- Solict highly respected US NGOs to form the corps of a friends of the Great Lakes group.

#### Objectives:

- Support "formal diplomatic track" with insights, contacts, people to people reconciliation (they can put Hutus together with Tutsis in patterns that USG can't for "reasons of State" o/e/ "bad" old government guys and others).
- Provide "live" feedback on human rights efforts -- what's working, what isn't, where are the gaps -- people, money.
- Strenthen international "NGO loop. (What do the French and others see and say.?

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- Designate a person (FSO 1 or 2) to specifically work with these groups.
- Build a media campaign around "peace and reconciliation"
  regional solution for regional problems.
- VOA campaign but reset beyond to French, Belgian and British.
- "PsyOps" campaign in local press and media.
- Find hi-profile U.S. and other pop artists to deliver message -- "We Are The World."
- Host conference or provide NGO "seed" money to host conference on "land-pressure" problems -- other solutions elsewhere.

# Short-Term Actions to Reinvigorate Preventive Diplomacy Efforts in Burundi.

- A. Current U.S. and international community efforts underway. These attempts help to bolster moderates and deter extremists and should continue.
- -- High-level visits and public statements.
- -- Promote dialogue. [We have devoted USD 5 million to a democracy/governance program that helps promote peaceful conflict resolution.]
- -- Move forward on the UN commission of inquiry.
- -- Move forward on aid to the Burundi judiciary. [The U.S. has USD 400,000 in ESF to make available for this; the Belgians are taking the lead.]
- Move forward with deployment of human rights monitors, provided they have adequate training, a clear mandate, and adequate security arrangements, and they coordinate their efforts with the Secretary General's special representative.
- -- continue visa sanctions. The U.S. has entered the names of 47 extremists in our look-out system, and will try to exclude them if they apply.
- B. The U.S. proposed the following additional measures:
- Encourage more meetings between regional leaders to address regional security and refugee issues.
- Encourage an African elder statesman such as Mugabe or Nyerere to become engaged over the long term to facilitate dialogue between the two communities:

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-- Greater use of the media, including:

- Peace broadcasts on local radio [AID is helping fund an effort underway by Search for Common Ground];

- Messages by respected world leaders [i.e., Mandela];

- Reconciliation programs developed and broadcast by western government media [VOA, others].
- -- Explore ways to persuade Burundian ex-president Bagaza to leave the country.
- -- Encourage regular visits by/contacts with responsible African and other militaries.
- -- Train to improve military discipline [the U.S. is resuming IMET to include a focus on respect for human rights and civilian supremacy.]
- -- Train a new, ethnically balanced civilian police force to relieve the military of the task of maintaining order.
- -- Explore regional arms restrictions.
- -- Explore assets freezes for extremists.

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